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Good morning. My name is Tom McDonnell. I am a Profes- 
sor at  Pace University School of Law. I am delighted to be here 
and I am privileged to be moderating this distinguished panel. 
It is reputed that Tallyrand once said, 'War is too impor- 
tant to be left to the generals," inspired by the Universal Decla- 
ration of Human Rights,l which Eleanor Roosevelt worked so 
diligently to bring about. Ordinary citizen groups in the last 
fifty years have demonstrated that foreign affairs, particularly 
as affecting the individual, are too important to be left to heads 
of state, to diplomats, or to big business. In 1948, when only 
forty-eight nongovernmental organizations had received con- 
sultative status with the U.N. Economic and Social Council2, to- 
day 1,350 NGOs have such status. In addition, 1,550 NGOs 
have status with the U.N.'s Department of Labor, up from 200 
in 1968. 
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948) [hereinaRer Universal Declaration]. 
2 Id. 
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As U.N. Under Secretary General Louise Frechette has 
said, "Today it is fair to say that NGOs are now entering into 
partnerships with states in the international law-making 
process ." 
Nowhere is this more vividly demonstrated than the events 
of the last two years. The international campaign to ban land 
mines,3 a coalition of hundreds of NGOs from over fifty-five 
countries, using primarily e-mail to organize themselves, 
spearheaded a grassroots movement that resulted in a Conven- 
tion to Ban Land Mines, which 122 nations have signed and, 
now up-to-date, forty-seven have ratified. 
Likewise, in July of this year in Rome, the ICC4 came 
about, but not simply because states were interested in it. Over 
200 NGOs participated in the drafting and ultimate approval of 
that statute. 
It is true that many challenges remain, but the door of citi- 
zen participation in the international law-making process has 
now been open, and perhaps will never be closed again due to 
the efforts of the human rights movement in the last fifty years. 
Our panel will be discussing some of the critical challenges 
that nongovernmental organizations and other private actors 
face as we move into the next millennium. 
Winston Nagan will be discussing the practical and theo- 
retical aspects facing nongovernmental organizations, and will 
also be discussing and comparing his experience with Amnesty 
International and his experience in setting up a new NGO in 
Uganda. One thought: of the 1,550 NGOs associated with the 
U.N., only 251 come from developing countries. Winston will 
give us a little bit of a comparison of some of the concerns that 
were raised in the panel discussions last night - that is to say, 
our particular concern about dealing with the so-called "second 
generation" rights, the rights to economic and social 
development. 
Winston is a native of South Africa. As a student, he was a 
member of the ANC5. He was exiled from that country in 1964. 
He later received degrees from Oxford, Duke, and Yale. He 
3 See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of A n t i - P e r s o ~ e l  Mines and on Their Destruction, 36 I.L.M. (1997). 
4 International Criminal Court. 
5 Afiican National Congress. 
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was, as you may know, twice the Chair of Amnesty Interna- 
tional USA, and he is also a Fellow to the World Academy of 
Arts and Sciences. A prolific writer on international legal is- 
sues, he is a Professor of Law at University of Florida School of 
Law. 
Aside from dealing with NGOs per se, we will be discussing 
two other non-state actors, the first being the so-called interna- 
tional agencies, specifically the World Bank. I am delighted 
that on our panel is Patricia Armstrong. She is a Senior Coordi- 
nator of the International Financial Institutions Program a t  the 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. She is also a member of 
the Steering Committee of the North American Assembly, an 
organization which works cooperatively with other regional as- 
semblies of the NGOs working on the World Bank. She will be 
discussing the interaction between her NGO and World Bank 
issues. 
Lastly, Richard Dicker will be speaking. He is the Director 
of Human Rights Watch's program on Corporations and Human 
Rights. He has done field work in the Americas and Asia, and 
specifically works on the Phillip van Heusen campaign regard- 
ing allegations of that company's failure to abide by concerns 
regarding freedom of association. 
I think we have an exciting group of panelists to listen to. I 
look forward to their comments. 
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Human Rights, INGOs, and Global Civil Society* 
We are here today to celebrate a landmark event in the 
moral experience of our species. In 1948, the Universal Decla- 
ration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the United 
Nations General Assemb1y.l Whatever the juridical limitations 
of the declaratory form of this major human rights instrument, 
it remains an explicit and authoritative codification of the most 
important value-commitments of the international community 
taken as a whole. Moreover, notwithstanding the increased ca- 
pacity for absolutely lethal violations of the most basic rights of 
individuals in all parts of the planet, the UDHR has seen a 
steady and critical endorsement of its normative priority, as 
well as an intense and critical, contemporary struggle to ground 
its normative priority in instances of practical application. In 
short, the UDHR has been a critical symbol in the struggle to 
enshrine a clearer picture of the foundational concept of human 
dignity and has provided a powerful inspiration, as well as le- 
gitimizing presence, in the struggle to enhance in the widest 
possible way the experience of fundamental respect and human 
dignity. 
* Prof. Nagan generously submitted a written transcript of the paper he 
presented a t  the Celebration. I t  is that paper, Human Rights, ZNGOs, and Global 
Civil Society, which is printed here. Notably, his remarks a t  the Celebration did 
not vary substantially from this paper. 
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR., 3d 
Sess., U.N. Doc.NB10 (1984) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
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It is a very great pleasure to be in New York. Like the 
larger social process context of human rights, New York is the 
great melting pot of unmelted lumps. It is notorious that the 
way New Yorkers seem to identify themselves would suggest 
that people like me, who come from the other side of the Hud- 
son, actually come from the "great unknown." In a sense, New 
York is, from a social process point-of-view, almost a paradigm 
of the larger, global human rights challenge. The larger world 
community comes with all the complexity of cultural, regional, 
religious, ideological, linguistic, ethnographic, gender diversity 
andlor stratification. The larger vista of the global community 
like New York is a vista - so to speak - which underlying 
pressures of globalism is a gigantic melting pot with a vast con- 
sistency of unmelted lumps. On the other hand, the senses of 
parochialism and inward-looking identifications often serve, 
perhaps, the unintended purpose of dis-identifying with the 
larger vista of humanity. In a sense, human rights activists 
from New York must have a keenly sensitive feel for the nature 
and structural preconditions that provoke human rights 
problems and challenge the capacity for human rights solutions. 
I have been asked to discuss the issue of the role of INGOs 
in the making and application of human rights law and prac- 
tice. I have, myself, been specifically involved with four major 
INGOs, working directly or indirectly with human rights mat- 
ters. These include the American branch of the International 
Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, the Policy Sciences 
Center, Amnesty International, and most recently, the Human 
Rights and Peace Centre of Makerere University. I hasten to 
add that I have had lesser roles on several other INGOs. For 
the purpose of this paper, I am going to focus on the role of IN- 
GOs in general. Then, I shall discuss more specifically some of 
the problems and issues that have touched upon a human 
rights organization that has often involved itself in direct action 
to secure human rights on a universal basis (Amnesty Interna- 
tional) and an academic INGO concerned with a more special- 
ized commitment to human rights activism that is appropriate 
to an INGO which has a specific academic mandate, as well as a 
broader sense of the intellectual responsibility higher education 
must embrace for the enhancement of human rights and peace 
(Makerere University, Human Rights and Peace Centre). 
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Perhaps the most general point that can be garnered from 
juxtaposing Amnesty International with Makerere's Human 
Rights and Peace Centre is that they are similar in the sense 
that they are concerned with human rights and that they are 
INGOs. However, they are quite different in the sense that they 
do vastly different things within the framework of the interna- 
tional human rights perspective. Indeed, this underlies the ba- 
sic insight that there are today a vast number of INGOs, who - 
I would venture to  say in fashionable terms - constitute what 
we may loosely call the "civil society." In point of fact, not every 
INGO is an operation that seeks benign and ideal humanitarian 
and human rights goals. Some INGOs may well be in the busi- 
ness of doing everything possible to disparage world order and 
human dignity, as for example, in those non-governmental op- 
erations that are specialized to organized crime, terrorism, 
paramilitary, proto-fascist, hate and violence groups, and so on. 
Other INGOs may be the quintessential representatives of pow- 
erful political and economic interests, and whose basic orienta- 
tion is not to  the vindication of the common interest humanity 
has in human dignity, but rather to special interest concerns 
that may or may not coincide with some version of the human 
dignity objective. In other words, we have to be cautious about 
the power vacuum produced by an uncritical proliferation of the 
global institutions of civil society, recognizing that some of 
these institutions of civil society are critical to the struggle for 
human rights, while others are critical to the struggle against 
human rights. 
INGOs, STRUGGLE, AND MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
The most important insight that we can garner about the 
role of the INGO in the protection and enhancement of univer- 
sal human rights is that INGOs are essentially involved in a 
struggle to vindicate the values of human rights and peace. In 
short, we may ask ourselves what currency contemporary 
human rights would have in a global system dominated by sov- 
ereign States and powerful interest groups animated by the im- 
peratives of what Professor Michael Reisman calls the "global 
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war ~ys tem."~  Let me provide three illustrations of this point. 
First, the International Court of Justice recently gave its advi- 
sory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
 weapon^.^ Although the Court was responding to a request for 
an advisory opinion from the General Assembly, in fact, this lit- 
igation would not have happened but for the pressures which 
emanated from those sectors of civil society concerned about the 
threat nuclear weapons pose to the future of humanity. A sec- 
ond example might also serve to clarify this point. Amnesty In- 
ternational had long-made the issue of torture a major part of 
both its mandate and its operational techniques to secure the 
abolition of torture on a global basis. It is true that the interna- 
tional community eventually promulgated an important con- 
vention which sought to outlaw torture and related practices. 
However, there would be no Torture Convention4 if not for the 
focused activism of Amnesty International in its struggle to se- 
cure the legal abolition of torture on a universal basis. In the 
context of humanitarian law, it requires no massive documenta- 
tion to appreciate the role of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) in its work to give legal and political efficacy 
to the basic rules governing the ius in bello. What we see in 
these three examples is that INGOs, however constituted, are 
involved in the struggle for human rights. 
I want to explore this general question of the struggle for 
human rights somewhat more carefully. The struggle for 
human rights is part of the larger struggle within social process 
for determining how the most fundamental values of a commu- 
nity are to be reproduced and distributed. This means, for ex- 
ample, that norm-creation, including human rights norm- 
creation, is an ongoing part of the dynamic of the social process 
of human interaction, and in this sense, is a struggle for and 
about power, and a struggle for constitutionalism and the rule 
of law. I submit that the perspective of human rights through 
2 See W .  Michael Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue 
for Decision, 14 VA. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1973). 
3 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 227-67. 
4 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment [hereinafter Torture Convention], 23 I.L.M. 1027 
(1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985). This Convention was adopted without a 
vote by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1984. It was en- 
tered into force on June 26, 1987. 
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the focal lens of struggle is a very critical aspect of not only the 
dynamic component of human rights, but also the larger dy- 
namic of social norm generation. In short, INGOs are often the 
pressure behind the process which seeks to generate improved 
normative understandings about expectations of dignity, im- 
proved normative expectations that may be grounded in juridi- 
cal form and operational practice, and which as well may serve 
as a further incentive for the application and enforcement as- 
pect of the human rights normative structure. 
It is not my intention to focus specifically on the technical 
processes of communication and collaboration within which IN- 
GOs have played a critical part in the globalization of human 
rights, in the cultural foundations of human rights, and in the 
juridical bases of human rights prescriptions. However, it may 
be worthwhile if we juxtapose the perspective of struggle about 
communication and collaboration for human rights objectives 
against the growth of specialized professions, organizations, 
and interest groups, all of whom hold deep concerns about the 
prospect of human dignity on a universal basis. 
Since this meeting is composed largely of members of the 
legal profession, it may be noted that the legal profession, and 
especially international lawyers, have been a critical building 
block for the vindication of human rights, both in theory and in 
operational practice. Hence, there is a very substantial tempta- 
tion to focus on the UDHR and allied instruments as represent- 
ing legal doctrine, sustained by human rights jurisprudence 
and falling within the sphere of what, conventionally, lawyers 
normally do. Lawyers would bring their skills of analysis, con- 
struction, and interpretation in order to define both the uni- 
verse of human rights law and the scope of its application. 
The difficult relationship between INGOs (that are not spe- 
cialists in the juridical sense) and the role of lawyers (who 
would have to self-consciously determine what is appropriate 
for juridical exposition, prescription, and application) would at 
best be a difficult exercise. For example, the temptation of law- 
yers may be to hold that certain kinds of alleged rights can 
never be reduced to legal rights. This might include the right to 
development, the right to peace, or the right to positive social 
entitlements. Since these rights are not amenable ostensibly to 
juridical resolution, they may not be viewed as human rights at 
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all, from a juridical point of view. This would be the struggle for 
perspective within which the law or legal profession would 
dominate. 
Let us take a second perspective. How would a philoso- 
pher, in general, look at the UDHR? A philosopher may see the 
UDHR as a species of moral declaration. This would essentially 
mean that human rights fall within the framework of the analy- 
sis of moral propositions. A philosopher would immediately rec- 
ognize that there is a vast amount of normative communication 
in the world of social and political experience. However, the 
philosopher would nonetheless hold that only a few normative 
expressions could qualify for the label "moral proposition," and 
fewer still would meet the test of universality. In short, there 
may be very few human rights that can meet the test of univer- 
sal moral human rights. 
Even more controversially, there may be the very founda- 
tional question of "what a right actually is." Philosophers have 
for example suggested that what is meant by the term "right" is 
the term "entitlement." When pressed to determine what an 
entitlement is, the answer in all likelihood is, "It is a right." 
These will also be influenced by the fact that the techniques of 
moral analysis are not the same as the techniques of legal anal- 
ysis. While the legal analysts sometimes include philosophical 
analysis in the process of justifying human rights, moral theory 
basically does not look for a "slot machine" answer to the valida- 
tion of the human rights norm. Philosophers basically look at a 
process of reason and justification, along the lines of the tradi- 
tion of Aquinas and others. 
There is a third perspective which we tend to associate with 
the social sciences, and often, with those who work in the prag- 
matic, philosophical tradition. In this perspective, human 
rights must be seen as a theory for inquiry. That is to say, 
while the codes and various official and quasi-official communi- 
cations tell us a great deal about the content and procedure of 
human rights, an understanding of human rights in its relation- 
ship to universal dignity requires an ongoing inquiring system. 
This perspective is related to the fourth perspective about 
which more will be said. If however, we hold that a theory for 
inquiry is an important aspect of human rights understanding, 
it is because the struggle for human rights often involves, at 
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least at the frontiers of the subject, a competition for claims and 
for normative priority. Thus, for example, the classic conun- 
drum of whether the freedom of the press should prevail over 
the rights of a defendant. This perspective would throw light on 
the social process context of human rights claiming, of human 
rights responses to claims, and of the lacunae within which 
claims generate limited, marginal or even no responses. In 
short, the inquiring lens might open up an important, neglected 
area about the problem of the human rights struggle in the form 
of claiming, counterclaiming, and the problem of social response 
to these phenomena. In other words, this perspective or focal 
lens may deepen our understanding of the context of social, 
moral, and legal experience. 
There is a fourth perspective that I want to get at and put 
into the framework of our conversation, and that is the theory of 
human rights as struggle, the eternal struggle for justice - the 
one that involves the INGOs; the one that involves ordinary 
folks; the one that involves the ordinary membership in organi- 
zations like Amnesty International, who pay their $25 a year 
and try to make some commitment to the improvement of the 
human prospect. The perspective of human rights as a process 
of struggle injbcts the issue of social dynamism and social 
change. The emphasis on human rights as a component of nor- 
matively guided change requires that we understand much 
more about the social and the power processes of global society 
and the role of critical actors who might be specialized to  the 
organization and presentation of claims relating to human 
rights. In this respect, the role of the INGO is a vital and im- 
portant element of the social, power, and constitutive context of 
human rights culture seen in global terms. 
Another aspect that serves to provide more clarity to the 
issue of claim assertion and human rights is the very term 
"rights" itself. It is notorious that different perspectives about 
human rights may give different nuances to the very term 
"right." The conception of rights may vary depending upon 
whether one brings a juridical, philosophical, sociological or  an- 
thropological, or historical lens to the elucidation of the concept 
of "right" in general, and "human rights" in particular. Thus, 
rights may derive their meaning from some formalistic criterion 
of validation, from some justification predicated on the univer- 
Heinonline - -  11 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 215 1999 
216 PACE ZNT'L L. REV. [Vol. 11:209 
sal moral norm, or from the understandings derived from social 
process and moral experience that come in the form of funda- 
mental expectations about right and wrong. This is a fertile 
area of confusion in a context which is essentially interdiscipli- 
nary, and which aspires to a level of practicality rooted in the 
actual realities of social organization. To illustrate some level 
of confusion, as we have seen, philosophers have often said that 
a right is essentially an entitlement. When they are pressed as 
to what an entitlement is, they maintain that it is a right. Per- 
haps these confusions may be moderated if the conception of 
human rights as rights is contextualized to include its founda- 
tional animus as a struggle about legal, political, economic, so- 
cial, cultural, sexual, racial, and ethnic agitation for an 
improved human prospect. The stress on the struggle context of 
human rights underlines the importance of understanding what 
exactly is happening in civil society from a global point of view, 
and to focus on the critical non-governmental actors who consti- 
tute the global civil society to determine the scope, character, 
and efficacy of their efforts to promote human rights and peace, 
or indeed to disparage it. 
One of the important insights that social realists have 
sought to bring to the analysis of international relations and 
international law is the insistence that the State, while a criti- 
cal participant in international, constitutional order, is by no 
means the only critical player in that order. Global society to- 
day witnesses a vast proliferation of players in the international 
arena, in addition to States; these include intergovernmental 
organizations, multinational corporations, political parties, 
pressure groups, paramilitary organizations, liberation move- 
ments, and the vast constellation of national and international 
non-governmental organizations, some of which are critical 
players in the struggle for human rights and peace. Taken lit- 
erally, the terms "non-governmental organization" include 
everything that is not governmental. Literally, this could mean 
organized crime, such as the Mafia on the one hand and the 
Carnegie Foundation on the other. It would be very useful to 
provide a historical gloss on the role of critical non-governmen- 
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tal players who have shaped the modern history of our global 
social process. 
During the 17th, lgth, and 19& Centuries, global society, 
which then was even more highly decentralized than it is today, 
came under the influence of interest groups deeply inspired by 
economic incentives. These interest groups formed themselves 
into vast corporations and may, in some respects, be seen as the 
forerunners of the multinational corporations of today. The 
English East India Company, founded in 1600, was one of the 
most profoundly important political and economic organizations 
for the extension of British colonial culture. The company set 
up its own courts; it  set up its own system of governance and 
administration. The company effectively administered India as 
a company possession until the latter part of the 19& Century 
when colonial administration set up the Raj. 
The Dutch East India Company was founded in 1602. I t  
colonized South Africa, which remained a company possession 
until the British occupied the Cape in the latter part of the 
Century. The company, in large part, was responsible for the 
establishment of the Dutch Colonial Empire in what was called 
Batavia, and which now is called Indonesia. These companies 
(English East India Company and Dutch East India Company) 
were essentially commercially driven entities, but their role en- 
compassed a great deal more than simply economic imperial- 
ism. Not only did these companies rule vast empires for several 
centuries, they also laid an essential predicate for the form of 
colonial public order of the 19* and early 20th Centuries. 
One might also include a brief reference to the British 
South Africa Company. The company was controlled by 
Rhodes, and Rhodes organized the company in such a way that 
the company included within its operations a private army for 
colonial expansion. The British South Africa Company con- 
quered Zimbabwe and claimed Zimbabwe as its own private 
property. In re Southern Rhodesia,5 decided in 1919, the Privy 
Council determined that the company could not have actually 
acquired the physical property of a whole country as its own 
private property; but in fact, neither did the blacks own it; it  
was owned by the King of England. 
5 In Re Southern Rhodesia, AC 1919. 
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Not all interests emerging from the civil society were as 
materialistically oriented as the great charter companies. For 
example, the London Missionary Society was the institutional 
harbinger of the famous philanthropic movement in England, 
which was essentially progressive in its own time when it came 
to the rights of colonial peoples. The philanthropic movement 
was especially interested in the advancement of education, the 
abolition of slavery, and represented a major element of the 
framework of progressive thinking in international affairs. 
One of the most remarkable books on the study of interna- 
tional relations in the 20th Century was Professor Harold D. 
Lasswell's World Politics and Personal I n s e c ~ r i t y . ~  At the time 
Lasswell wrote the book - in the 1930s- , it was said that "it 
was an absolutely great book but nobody knew why." The ques- 
tion he raised struck at  the heart of the conventional approach 
to international relations and international law. If interna- 
tional relations focused on the problem of conflict and war, it 
was a conflict and war between sovereign States. In interna- 
tional law, the doctrine was - and to some extent still is - 
important. It was a law by sovereign States for sovereign 
States. The idea that world politics might include variables of a 
non-State character, or that personal insecurity might be a con- 
sequence and a condition of the global war system, was a star- 
tling idea even in its own time. Indeed, I suspect it is a 
startling idea even today. Among other things, Lasswell's the- 
ory pointed to a very important foundational precept of the in- 
ternational system, that there were participants other than the 
State from a realistic point of view that have to be accounted 
for, namely, that these participants outside of necessarily the 
State framework influence, but who nonetheless condition, im- 
pact, and are being impacted by world order issues. 
The above insight is reflected in the contemporary era in 
the People's Earth Declaration. The Declaration, in part, reads 
as follows: 
6 HAROLD . LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY (1935); 
(reprinted , 1965). 
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We, the people of the world, will mobilize the forces of transna- 
tional civil society behind a widely shared agenda that bonds our 
many social movements in pursuit of just, sustainable, and par- 
ticipatory human societies. In doing so, we are forging our own 
instruments and processes for redefining the nature and meaning 
of human progress and for transforming those institutions that no 
longer respond to our needs. 
The People's Earth Declaration is a challenging proposi- 
tion. It ties in to some degree with the theme, that when we 
look at  the INGOs, we look at agents of change; at  the processes 
of agitation to improve the circumstance in all spheres, includ- 
ing the legal, the political, the economic; and more. Moreover, it 
seems to be clear that the next millennium will still operate 
under the benign - as well as lethal - influences of whatever 
world order arrangements we have inherited since World War 
11. Among the themes that came out of World War I1 experience 
is the notion of total war - that is, in a sense, a war on the 
entire social process itself. This is an important theme. 
The idea of conducting war on the entire social process, as 
distinct from professional armies relatively exclusively in com- 
bat, is a very different and disturbing concept for human experi- 
ence. In the context of this kind of war, the role of people's 
movements of resistance began to emerge, and therefore we 
cannot absolve ourselves from the challenges of people's move- 
ments - first in Eastern Europe, later in Africa and Asia and 
Latin America - emerging as instruments of radical, some- 
times even revolutionary, change. However, their modern roots 
are tied to the processes of Nazi hegemony and Japanese proto- 
fascism. 
The Nuremberg process directly and indirectly impacted 
upon the position of non-state actors in international law. The 
rise of the Nuremberg Precepts are important in this regard, 
and parenthetically, are something of an historical accident, 
contrary to the views of some people here that there seems to be 
some kind of an inevitability about Nuremberg: it was an acci- 
dent that it happened. The first inklings of trials actually came 
out of Stalin. In 1942, when some concrete expression was 
made to give this suggestion some form, there was resistance to 
it. The British were the prime resistors. They did not want it. 
They demolished the American delegation negotiating the Nu- 
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remberg Precepts in London in 1944. The resilient Americans 
showed up in San Francisco in 1945 with a far more compelling 
defense of the Nuremberg proposals. The opponents of Nurem- 
berg were caught unprepared in San Francisco, and so in retro- 
spect, one might see the Nuremberg Process as something of an 
accident. Indeed, Stalin had talked about shooting 50,000 Ein- 
satzgruppen. Churchill was much more humane and thought 
the Allies should shoot about 5,000 of the S.S. 
From the standpoint of world order and international rela- 
tions, Nuremberg does very important things in terms of theory 
and practice. For example, the Nuremberg process penetrates 
the veil of the State, and in doing so, radically modifies the 
traditional understanding of the concept of sovereignty. 
Although there are powerful forces today who often assert a 
near absolutist conception of sovereignty, this is a view that is 
increasingly seen as a very odd construction of the constitu- 
tional position of a State in international society. However the 
breach in the immutable, if not omnipotent, conception of sover- 
eignty, in large measure, is due to the Nuremberg experience; 
and in this sense, that experience is a very revolutionary one. 
To extend this analysis further, Nuremberg makes individuals 
subject to international law. It also gives those individuals 
rights to adequate representation and fair judicial proceedings, 
which are rights guaranteed by the international character of 
the process. That is to say, Nuremberg changes the subjectlob- 
ject dimension of international legal order. The same is true 
with people's rights, with individual rights, and with the appli- 
cation of humanitarian precepts. The legacy of Nuremberg into 
the Charter - with its focus on human rights and on 'We, the 
people" - does create a t  least some kind of a modest doctrinal 
predicate for non-State actors participating in the system. 
We are currently experiencing a post-Cold War era under 
pressures of political and economic globalism. Immense pres- 
sures are being exerted on the State system. However, these 
pressures are different from the pressures experienced during 
the heyday of the Cold War. During the Cold War, the pressure 
on the State system focused on levels of subordination to Super- 
power security and ideological interests. This came at  a point 
when emerging States were attempting to assert a form of sov- 
ereignty that might insulate them from the political hegemony 
Heinonline - -  11 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 220 1999 
19991 HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-STATE ACTORS 221 
of the Cold War. The Cold War produced or reproduced a vigor- 
ous assertion of sovereignty on the part of small States, and a 
vigorous depreciation of sovereignty a t  the altar of ideological 
expediency of the imperial powers. The Cold War and the aspi- 
rations of global hegemony put pressure on the States in terms 
of levels of subordination to superpower interests. In addition 
to inter-State conflicts were the pressures to decolonize the 
world community, and therefore, additional pressures to recog- 
nize movements of national liberation and self-determination as 
critical players in the international system. These conflicts sim- 
ply underlined the critical importance of both human rights and 
humanitarian issues in the emerging pattern of changing inter- 
national social order. 
The critical importance of the civil society construct as an 
ideological perspective should also be seen in the context of the 
ideological rifts of East and West during the Cold War. In the 
East, we had the idea of a total State and a command economy. 
In the West, we either had the idea of the democratic State, an 
open economy, and the critical space for civil society. The total 
State, to the extent that it  permits interests to be articulated, 
expresses them through the State or through the party. The 
democratic State encourages expression of interest that is es- 
sentially more anarchic and, in some views, more free. 
GLOBALISM, CML SOCIETY, AND INGOs: THE NEW IDEOLOGY 
The roles of the State and civil society, as well as the 
growth of INGOs record a great deal of tension and conflict in 
the context of the Cold War era. In this part of the essay, we 
throw some light on how these tensions have played themselves 
out in the post-Cold War period. One point is very clear: the 
idea of civil society, viewed from a global perspective, is to a 
very large extent viewed as an incipient form of global democra- 
tization. I t  is unclear, whether as an ideological construct, this 
is sufficiently sensitive to the reality'of the distribution of power 
in the global civil society, but nonetheless, i t  is ideologically pro- 
moted as a very critical component of an  improved world order. 
The Union of International Associations urges that we are 
in the midst of a global revolution relating to the context, struc- 
ture, and process of civil society. The organization holds, for ex- 
ample, that there are incipient trends toward global 
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democratization that are powerful and that there are incipient 
trends toward the visualization of an alternative organization 
design, although the organization does not tell us exactly what 
the alternative design is. 
There exist large and complex organizations in the interna- 
tional system, which are deeply impacted upon by the commu- 
nications revolution. Critical indices are being developed to 
determine the extent of cohesion and bonding, as well as the 
level of formalization and coherence, of INGOs. According to 
the Union of International Associations, 
There are many large, complex organizations, whether intergov- 
ernmental organizations or multinational corporations - or their 
national equivalents. Many not-for-profit organizations are in- 
creasingly complex. Such complexity takes the form of numerous 
specialized units. The challenge is to ensure that they work to- 
gether in a coherent, meaningfd manner - however that comes to 
be understood. Increasingly, the communications of such organi- 
zations are electronically based. The question is how the commu- 
nications between the parts are organized. 
The "weak-bonding" approach may ensure some valued, but hap- 
hazard, communication between specialized units - although this 
is often subject to suspicious hierarchical controls or abuse. Some 
forms of groupware provide a form of strong-bonding (commit- 
ment checking, etc.). But again i t  may be useful to explore the 
notions of interlocking round tables as  the basis for the emergence 
of new forms of non-hierarchical organization that may be vital to 
sustainable community. I t  might prove to be the case that the 
sustainibility [sic] of a community results from appropriate global 
configuration - interlocking the diversity of community dialogue 
arenas. 
When we place these insights in the context of the emer- 
gent "new" Globalism Epoch, the importance of understanding 
the role of INGOs in the context of the move toward 
global democratization requires us to understand more ade- 
quately the conditions shaping the future of world order and 
world politics. How are we to understand the "forces" of global- 
ism and the role of INGOs within it? James Rosenau argues 
that "the best way to grasp world affairs today is to view them 
as an endless series of tensions in which the forces pressing for 
greater globalization and those pressing for greater localization 
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interactively play themselves out."' These forces, Rosenau ar- 
gues, are influenced by the skill and communication revolution, 
the "organizational explosionns which witnesses "staggering 
number of new organizations,"g some tightly organized with 
clear lines of interest and authority, and others that are "loosely 
structured."lO These processes suggest States are getting 
stronger in some respects and weaker in others; there is a reas- 
sertion of the archaic idea of "sovereignty," while it is being 
eroded by the facts of economic, military, and cultural interde- 
pendence. In addition, there is the exponential growth of IN- 
GOs, including human rights INGOs. 
In short, the structural foundations of international order 
are in flux as the locus of power becomes rearranged and in- 
creasingly fluid. At the theoretical level, we are witnessing a 
profound change in the structure and process of international 
constitutional order, in which there is considerable rearrange- 
ment of the vectors of control and authority in international so- 
ciety. To the credit of the UN ECSOC, it long ago recognized 
the importance of consultative status with INGOs, as indicated 
in its Resolution 1296 (XLIV) (1968). Among the criteria for 
such status (apart from acting within the Charter framework) 
was that such a group have an established headquarters, a 
democratic constitution, an international "structure," and con- 
trols over its resource base. In conclusion, the role of the IN- 
GOs in the defense and enhancement of a global era of human 
rights must be seen in light of the emerging world context. The 
clichk holds that ours is an epoch of globalism. What exactly 
this means is in some measure controverted. As a loose gener- 
alization, ours is an epoch of extraordinary dynamic potential- 
ity. The capacity to inflict human misery, even to provoke a 
crisis of survivability of humankind has enormously enhanced 
potentials. Similarly, the capacities to do good, to enhance the 
human prospect, and to make great strides toward a public or- 
der of universal dignity are also enhanced. The "struggle" 
continues. 
7 James Rosenau, The Future of Politics, paper presented to the World As- 
sembly of the World Academy of Art and Science, November 1998. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
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INGOs, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INFORMAL AW-MAKING 
Human beings, in their interaction and relations with 
others, are a norm-generating species. Therefore, it is surpris- 
ing and somewhat astigmatic that a foundational idea of tradi- 
tional jurisprudence is that all law-making is a State 
prerogative. A critical area of note is the role that INGOs actu- 
ally play in the processes of norm generation and norm applica- 
tion in the human rights context. It has long been recognized 
that the associations, affiliations, and groups that constitute the 
global social process are indeed institutions with a dynamic "liv- 
ing law" component, i.e., there is a factual or behavioral law or 
constitution that coexists with the "formal" law. The law-mak- 
ing role of INGOs is an understudied phenomenon, but a critical 
dimension of human rights law and the legal structure that sus- 
tains it. Would we, for example, have had a Torture Conven- 
tionll without Amnesty International? Would we have had the 
Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunal12 without the work of 
the Watch Committees? Therefore, we must see in the "new" 
epoch that human rights law-making and application is a 
richer, more comprehensive, and more complex process than the 
older, State-centered paradigm. 
The insight relating to the role of INGOs in informal law- 
making raises a further practical problem because of the vast 
disparity and differences in the structure and organization of 
INGOs, even if their objectives are directed at issues of interna- 
tional peace and human rights. Essentially, if they are moved 
by the ideology and spirit of democracy, and if they see them- 
selves as part of the evolution of global civil society moving in- 
crementally toward a global process of self-generating 
democratic values, then we need to more carefully appraise the 
efficacy of critical conditions that sustain notions of democracy 
at  any Ievel of social organization. In general, this will reflect 
upon questions that relate to the nature of the decision process 
11 Torture Convention, supra note 4. 
12 For example, the Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and 
the Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. See generally, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI &
PETER MANIKAs, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FOR- 
MER YUGOSLAVIA (1996); JOHN R. W. D. JONES, THE PRACTICE OF THE INTERNA- 
TIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA (1997); 
VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 
FOR RWANDA (1998). 
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and the claiming process that inform the INGO. How inclusive, 
for example, is participation in the decision process of the 
INGO? How transparent, accountable, and responsible is that 
decision process? The critical institutions of democratic ideol- 
ogy must ultimately confront the nature of its essential decision 
process. Such a consideration will include a number of specific 
issues and questions that must be assayed. For the sake of 
brevity, these issues are listed as follows: 
1) The issue of transparency. 
2) The structure of decision making: is it hierarchical or 
democratic? 
3) The level of bureaucracy: how permeable or impermeable is the 
bureaucracy? 
4) The capture of INGOs and the possibility of personal agendas 
by the operative decision makers. 
5) The issue of secretive decision making within the framework of 
an INGO. 
6) The possibility of special interest "tunnel vision" conceptions 
with respect to functions and operations of INGOs. 
7) The possibility that they may be even close-minded in their 
critical decision processes and structures insulated, if you like. 
8) The complexities of how they are funded, and how responsible 
they are for the funding that they get. 
9) Invidious problems that touch on competing for scarce funding 
resources. In other words, often human rights INGOs, humanita- 
rian INGOs, really ought to be functioning with a view to their 
extinction. They are rather happy when terrible things happen 
because they are funding opportunities. 
Amnesty International is one of the most important INGOs 
in the human rights movement. It is a non-governmental or- 
ganization in the classic sense of the term. It seeks to  influence 
governments in terms of human rights performance, but it pro- 
claims itself to be independent of any governmental influence. 
Amnesty International is generally viewed as a First World 
human rights organization, although it has a powerful presence 
in the Third World as well. It has historically been aggressive 
in promoting human rights development as an important part 
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of universalizing the influence of its mandate. Amnesty Inter- 
national is divided, roughly speaking, into two significant com- 
ponents. First, there is the professional staff operating in its 
Secretariat and in its national sections. Second, there are the 
volunteers, the movement, which is comprised of any person 
who wishes to pay modest dues in order to become a member of 
the organization. It is a membership intensive organization. 
The members make policy, and the supreme policy-making body 
within the organization is its elected international council. Be- 
cause it is a membership intensive organization, Amnesty In- 
ternational incorporates many of the criteria associated with 
democratic decision-making, including appropriate levels of 
transparency, accountability, and responsibility. 
Amnesty International is organized upon the basis of an in- 
dependent mandate. That mandate incorporates many of the 
important human rights provisions in the UDHR, but it is, by 
choice, a narrow mandate; its members fight crucial battles 
within the organization to keep the mandate narrow. The rea- 
son for a narrow mandate is that the organization is particu- 
larly interested in being effective with respect to the protection 
of human rights that fall within its mandate. The broader the 
mandate, the greater the demands for strategies of action that 
are effective. A narrower mandate gives a great priority to the 
efficacy of practical, strategic intervention. 
Amnesty International's mandate has been extraordinarily 
successful, but it is not without its critics. Perhaps the most 
important limitation on the Amnesty International mandate is 
giving a narrow gloss to human rights that effectively justifies a 
narrow conception of human rights, even when that is not nec- 
essarily the animating reason for a narrow mandate. A narrow 
mandate also imposes a cognitive methodology on those who 
employ it. That methodology may run the risk of removing 
human rights violations from the relevant social and political 
contexts. By de-contextualizing human rights violations, we 
may provide short-term gains in the protection of human rights; 
however, we may obscure the broader framework of conditions 
that reproduce those human rights violations, thereby inhib- 
iting broader, strategic policies that are critical to ameliorating 
the root causes of gross human rights violations. These limita- 
tions are very apparent in context of armed conflict or in the 
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context of those forms of conflict that are loosely styled "ethnic 
conflict." These kinds of conflicts have not been effectively as- 
sayed in Amnesty International's work profile, although the or- 
ganization has recognized, perhaps belatedly, the importance of 
sustainable and durable peace initiatives to the protection of 
fundamental human rights. 
In the context of the Gulf War, Amnesty International 
emerged with a powerful report detailing the ubiquity of the 
grossest forms pf human rights violations by the Iraqi dictator, 
Saddam Hussein. One of the stories in the report suggested that 
the regime had sanctioned the removal of premature babies 
from incubators in Kuwait. When the report was about to be 
released, the leadership in the organization expressed concerns 
about whether its report might not fuel the gods of war. As it 
turned out, the report was immediately distributed to the entire 
Congress of the United States by the Bush administration and 
was used by President Bush as one of the vehicles for the de- 
monizing of the Iraqi dictator. This kind of problem is difficult 
for a narrowly-focused human rights organization that does not 
take a position on who is right or wrong in the context of an 
armed conflict. Yet, the report of the organization would have 
the effect of an alignment on one side of the conflict, even if this 
were not intended. Here, the narrow mandate and its non-con- 
textual focus on human rights violations have the disadvantage 
of blinding the organization's decision-makers to, the political 
consequences of releasing such a report. Perhaps if Amnesty 
International had been a broader human rights group con- 
cerned with peace as well, it might have been easier to strike a 
balance between its need to tell the truth, and its need to tell 
the truth in a timely and responsible manner. 
The narrow mandate of Amnesty International also pro- 
vided the organization with great difficulties in accepting the 
possibility that it could denounce apartheid. It maintained, 
somewhat disingenuously, that apartheid was purely ideologi- 
cal and that its policies relating to the freedom of conscience 
would not permit a resolute condemnation of it. Although it 
had been argued that apartheid was more than ideology, that in 
fact it was operational policy and practice - and that as opera- 
tional policy and practice, it was completely inconsistent with 
the entire prescriptive force of the UDHR - the organization's 
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decision structure was never able to sufficiently contextualize 
the apartheid process to  secure a clear condemnation of it as 
simply inconsistent with human rights and with the organiza- 
tion's own mandate. 
These problems are illustrative of the proposition that, on 
the one hand, human rights activism involving mass-based par- 
ticipation requires simplification in order to generate the rele- 
vant level of legitimizing efficacy. On the other hand, the 
conception of human rights, somewhat immunized from context 
- and therefore immunized from understanding the complex 
interdependencies that shape the broader and more comprehen- 
sive relationship of human rights to  peace and human rights to 
justice-, is in some measure sacrificed. Stated shortly, an INGO 
such as Amnesty International represents important possibili- 
ties, but also important limitations in universalizing the culture 
of human rights for the millennium. 
We may now move to the experience of creating a Third 
World INGO, the Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPEC) 
of Makerere University in Uganda. The most important factor 
about the HURIPEC is that it is located in a center of higher 
learning, and therefore, its focus cannot be entirely on activism. 
Since the primary purpose of a university is education and en- 
lightenment, it will be obvious that the foundational question of 
a self-respecting human rights and peace center will be on the 
very conception of human rights itself. Since in the university 
setting almost every aspect of learning and pedagogy has some 
intersection with some aspect of peace and human rights, it will 
be obvious that an academic center of learning must, for aca- 
demic purposes, embrace a conception of human rights that is 
comprehensive and far-reaching. This basically means that, 
however inchoately expressed, human rights - in the first in- 
stance - represents a kind of theory for inquiry. The bounda- 
ries of human rights, from an intellectual point of view, are not 
finite, but are critical for scientific inquiry, philosophical reflec- 
tion, and juridical application. 
With this background, the establishment of HURIPEC 
came in the context of a society that had experienced nightmar- 
ish human rights deprivations during the period of Idi Amin 
and Milton Obote. The most practical initiative brought in at 
the beginnings of the project was how to create programs that 
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would capitalize on student and faculty initiatives and energy 
for which there could be practical benefits. Since the project 
was started in Makerere University's law school, the represen- 
tation of the poor and the position of women presented natural 
opportunities for outreach. From these experiences, HURIPEC 
developed proposals for expanding the curriculum of the entire 
university so that every student entering the university would 
have to take a course in human rights and peace as a condition 
of graduation. The course would be taught by a team of faculty 
from many different disciplines, and at  its heart, would be a 
multi-method, interdisciplinary approach to human rights. 
HURIPEC also developed a series of workshops that would 
promote a renaissance in interdisciplinary perspectives, from a 
human rights point of view. Each discipline was asked to reflect 
on what it did in teaching, public service and outreach, and re- 
search that had an impact on issues of human rights and peace, 
conceived of in the most comprehensive sense. Ultimately, the 
organizers of HURIPEC saw human rights and peace as mat- 
ters of foundational intellectual responsibility. Therefore, those 
organizers envisioned that ultimately the university itself could 
not be seen as being either neutral or above matters of peace 
and basic dignity. In short, the purpose of the university, 
through the advancement of its teaching, research, and public 
service missions, is to take intellectual and social responsibility 
for peace and human rights. 
HURIPEC has become an important intellectual arena for 
continental, regional, and national networking to bond the vari- 
ous segments in the various communities that are concerned 
with peace and human rights issues. HURIPEC's bold efforts 
- in not simply making human rights and peace a part of the 
university's agenda, but also in making it central to the identity 
and the mission of the university - may have far-reaching im- 
plications for higher education in Africa. In a region such as the 
Great Lakes, where political instability and insecurity are om- 
nipresent facts of life, taking leadership in such an enterprise is 
not without its risks. Nonetheless, it is precisely this kind of 
courage and this kind of initiative emanating from the civil soci- 
ety that poses the important challenge for the business of tak- 
ing human rights and peace seriously as we approach the 
millennium. 
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INGOs do not resolve the problems of managing power 
responsibly in the international arena. However, their exist- 
ence and importance provokes a critical dialogue about the rela- 
tionship of civil society to state action and the relation of these 
interests to the culture of human rights, and global common in- 
terests in peace, security, ecological integrity and the basic de- 
cencies in human associational behavior we equate with 
inherent dignity and respect. 
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Associate Counsel, Human Rights Watch 
I want to begin my remarks on this celebratory occasion by 
noting the exciting growth of both human rights standards and 
the human rights movement. I think both Tom and Winston 
gave a sense of the growth of the human rights movement over 
the last fifty years. But certainly, the number of international 
human rights instruments has increased. The coverage, the 
number, and the types of people and violations included under 
those standards have increased. 
I think it is important for us to take note of the real dyna- 
mism and evolution in the conceptual and theoretical nature of 
this movement. I think it is crucial because to remain relevant 
and effective, we need to remain very dynamic, and I do not 
think anyone would argue that now is not a time for compla- 
cency. We need to be dynamic and principled because the world 
is changing and more is demanded in order to extend protec- 
tions to individuals and victims. 
I want to root my remarks really in the history of a need for 
dynamism and development. Admittedly, while I will be a little 
bit provocative this morning, there can be no question that in 
the area of non-state actors, and particularly corporations, the 
movement needs to develop its tools and the standards that 
have enabled us to work effectively with government actors over 
the last fifty years. Very quickly, I want to sketch out the objec- 
tive landscape as we see it. 
The greater mobility of capital and its penetration abroad 
has had profound human rights consequences. The importance 
of corporate social responsibility for human rights has been un- 
derscored by the opening of markets worldwide and the interna- 
tional, national, and local measures to attract capital 
investment. Increasingly, corporations operate in states with 
widespread and serious human rights violations. 
Since the end of the Cold War nearly ten years ago, invest- 
ment has moved into countries from which i t  had been previ- 
ously barred - Vietnam, Cambodia, Eastern Europe, and the 
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former Soviet Union. Investment has also flowed into countries 
in which it had been present previously, but the investment 
now takes a much more dynamic form - I am thinking of El 
Salvador, Guatemala, India, to name only a few. This is true in 
manufacturing, especially export assembly production, but also 
in oil and mining. 
In addition, accompanying these objective trends there has 
been a decreased role of government and intergovernmental 
assistance and loans. For these reasons, corporations often 
have considerable power to influence human rights practices in 
the countries in which they operate. At the same time, poor 
human rights conditions reflect a lack of respect for the rule of 
law t h a t  may threaten international investments in the 
country. 
In either case, corporations investing in large-scale opera- 
tions owe it to their investors and taxpayers, not to mention po- 
tential victims of human rights violations, to address human 
rights conditions in countries they have targeted for 
investment. 
Now, over the last several years, much attention has fo- 
cused on low-wage, labor-intensive industries - like textiles, 
apparel, footwear, and electronics - where companies fre- 
quently jump to new locations for lower and lower wages, and 
locations where governments are more tolerant of labor rights 
abuse. 
I will focus this morning on another sector where, for stra- 
tegic reasons, Human Rights Watch has targeted its work, the 
extractive industries, and particularly oil. 
In the extractive sector, the search for finite natural re- 
sources compels companies to pursue resources wherever the 
commodity can be found. Propelled by rising demand and new 
technologies over the last several years, multinational oil com- 
panies have explored and drilled across large swathes of in- 
creasingly remote areas. Multinational oil companies are 
working vigorously to drill and transport oil out of Central Asia, 
Africa, and the Americas to far-flung markets abroad. 
We have monitored oil and gas extraction projects in 
Burma, Colombia, and Nigeria, carried out by IGEP, British Pe- 
troleum, Elf Aquitaine, Occidental Petroleum, Royal Dutch 
Shell, Total, and Unocal. 
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We know from a conceptual point of view that basic inter- 
national human rights standards were not draRed to apply to 
corporations, and we have worked to fill a real conceptual gap. 
My organization has tried to do that by developing a conceptual 
approach of working guidelines that are based on an accomplice 
liability theory; that is, complicity by corporations in govern- 
mental human rights violations. I want to just extract a little 
bit from the policy that we have developed to give you a sense of 
how that works. 
Recognizing that corporations have become a potent force 
in the shaping of human rights worldwide, Human Rights 
Watch believes that businesses have a duty to avoid complicity 
in, or advantage from, human rights violations. We focus our 
research and advocacy efforts on circumstances where that duty 
has not been fulfilled and where companies have complicity in 
governmental human rights violations. There are a few para- 
digmatic situations where we see complicity. 
We are most concerned about situations of direct corporate 
complicity. In these instances, businesses facilitate or collabo- 
rate in government human rights violations. So while govern- 
ment forces commit the violations, corporations have acted as 
accomplices and beneficiaries. 
One manifestation of this kind of complicity is a situation 
where the company acts as an agent of a human rights-violative 
policy of a government. An example that comes to mind is the 
Chrysler Beijing Jeep firing of a worker who was detained by 
the Beijing Public Security Bureau in 1994 for his involvement 
in unauthorized religious and pro-democracy activities. Essen- 
tially, Chrysler's decision to fire this individual was an imple- 
mentation of the Beijing Public Security Bureau's persecution 
and harassment of him. 
Another such example that certainly was in the news a few 
years back is Royal Dutch Shell's involvement in security force 
attacks on Ogoni protesters in southeastern Nigeria. In that 
situation, the company failed to criticize human rights viola- 
tions that were committed in a wide-scale manner when the au- 
thorities were acting in response to corporate requests for 
security protection. That is direct corporate complicity. 
There is another form that we have seen and we are con- 
cerned about. That is when corporations derive advantages 
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from the failure of government respect for, and enforcement of, 
their international human rights obligations. In this situation, 
governments are involved in systematic violations of rights and 
they fail to uphold their obligation to implement laws to comply 
with obligations. It is, in a sense, a situation of state omission 
and corporate commission, if you will. 
The example I have in mind is General Motors' systematic 
practice of sex discrimination in conducting forced pregnancy 
testing on the Maquilladores in northern Mexico. Despite work- 
ers' complaints to state agencies responsible for enforcing Mex- 
ico's laws that were consistent with the ICCPR,l as well as the 
Convention on the Elimination Of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women,2 Mexico failed to protect those rights and Gen- 
eral Motors was a beneficiary of that failure. 
The third instance of corporate complicity are those ex- 
traordinary situations where we would recommend no new pri- 
vate investment, a suspension of business operations, a boycott, 
or even a withdrawal of all foreign private investment. Such a 
situation where we would criticize corporate presence per se is 
exemplified by the conditions in Burma today under the SLORC 
military junta. 
Such a situation is characterized by several of the following 
factors: grave and systematic rights abuse, abuses of such a na- 
ture that no business enterprise can avoid taint by operating in 
the country; no form of pressure from the international commu- 
nity has had, or has, any reasonable prospect of having a signifi- 
cant effect on those abuses. 
That, in a nutshell, is the working model of complicity that 
we have tried to develop in a conceptual way to fill some of the 
, 
gap that we see in the international standard. Now, this is only 
a working formulation, and I do not want to suggest that this 
guideline is the last word. We have a long way to go in deepen- 
ing our analysis, and we are looking at  other paradigms. 
One very interesting and provocative analysis is developing 
in U.S. litigation. This is emerging in the case brought by Bur- 
mese citizens against the Burmese Government and Unocal 
1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. U.N.T.S. No. 14668; 
Vol999 (1976) G.S. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 IN. GAOR Supp. (No.16) at 52, U.N. Doc. 
A16316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
2 U.N.T.S. No. 20378 Vol. 1249, Dec. 18, 1981. 
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C~rporation,~ which had entered into a joint venture for the 
construction of a natural gas pipeline from the Yadana natural 
gas field through Burma to Thailand. The case is being liti- 
gated in U.S. District Court in California. 
I want to focus on one aspect of Judge Paez's order of April 
1997 that was issued in response to Unocal's motion to dismiss. 
The judge held the court did have jurisdiction over claims 
against the oil company even if it did not have jurisdiction over 
the Burmese Government, and the applicable legal standard 
was the Alien Tort Claims Act.4 
The plaintiffs have alleged that SLORC,5 the Burmese mili- 
tary junta, and the Burmese state oil companies were agents of 
Unocal, that the defendants were joint venture partners work- 
ing in concert with one another, and that the defendants had 
conspired to commit violations of international law alleged in 
the complaint in order to hr ther  this gas pipeline. The plain- 
tiffs allege that the private defendants were jointly engaged 
with state officials in the challenged activity - namely, forced 
labor and other human rights violations - in furtherance of the 
pipeline project. These allegations the court found were suffi- 
cient to support subject matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act. 
What is particularly interesting - and this is what I really 
want to signal for you here - is the court's treatment of the 
state action requirement under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 
Judge Paez identified four distinct approaches that the 
Supreme Court had articulated on state action requirement: 
public function, state compulsion, nexus, and joint action. In 
this instance, the court applied the joint action approach and it 
found that the private actor (Unocal) could be a state actor if it 
was a willful participant in joint action with the state or its 
agents. Thus, the court found state action on the basis of a joint 
venture agreement. 
Admittedly, this was a case of tort liability. But the issue of 
interest here is not the similarity or dissimilarity of tort litiga- 
tion and international human rights standards, but whether 
3 Doe v. Unocal27 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (1998). 
4 28 U.S.C. 0 1350 (1994). 
5 State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). 
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these tests for state action provide an appropriate mode of anal- 
ysis for complicity in human rights violations. 
In any case, I want to set that out on the table. I think it 
opens some very interesting questions that need to be thought 
through carefully. But what I see here is the possibility of tak- 
ing a fresh look at those ways in which international human 
rights standards can be applied directly to private actors. 
Now, having touched on corporate complicity, I want to talk 
very briefly about the emergence in the last few years of an ex- 
citing and interesting development, and that is the effort by cor- 
porations to develop voluntary codes of conduct. There have 
been numerous initiatives here in the United States and in 
Western Europe. Some of these are very promising. 
The Apparel Industry Partnership, the Council on Eco- 
nomic Priorities, Social Accountability, 800 Program, these pro- 
mote global codes of conduct on fair labor practices and include 
an attempt a t  credible independent monitoring. There is too lit- 
tle time to go into these in any detail, but I do want to flag two 
points for you. 
First, the problem that we have seen is the translation of 
broad standards into specific policies. In other words, when you 
talk with Royal Dutch Shell or you talk with British Petroleum, 
the issue is not the formulation of the broad human rights norm 
and their acceptance of it as much as it is translating that into 
specific policies that will make a difference. The rubber hits the 
road outside the gates of the Royal Dutch Shell factory in Ogoni 
land, and that is where the broad principle needs to be refined 
and articulated as a principle. 
Another issue, and a very, very difficult issue with these 
voluntary codes of course, is implementation, and specifically 
the transparency of implementation and the involvement of 
outside actors, particularly actors from the local NGO commu- 
nity, and not keeping any monitoring and reporting on corpo- 
rate adherence to these voluntary codes an in-house affair. 
Those are big problems. 
I think that the two programs I mentioned, the AIP and the 
Social Accountability Standards, have made efforts at that. But 
we have yet to see - really, it will take a while - what the real 
fruits of those activity are. 
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I want to just flag for you the kind of specific policies we 
think corporations need to adopt if their commitment to human 
rights is to be something more than a public relations gesture. 
For example, we did a report on oil companies in Colombia, 
where the oil companies were making direct payments to mili- 
tary forces protecting their facilities and those military forces 
were linked to widespread human rights and humanitarian law 
violations. We recommended - and this would have been 
adopted voluntarily by British Petroleum if they chose to do so 
- that: 
The companies insert a clause into any security agreement 
signed with the government or any state entity that requires 
as a condition of contract that state security forces operating 
in the area of company installations conform to the human 
rights obligations the government has assumed, as well as 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, as well as other international human rights and hu- 
manitarian norms. 
Where such formal arrangements exist, the companies' secur- 
ity agreements with state entities should be made public, with 
the sole exception of operative details that could jeopardize in- 
dividual lives. 
The companies should insist on screening the military and po- 
lice who are assigned for their protection in consultation with 
the defense ministry and civilian government agencies in 
charge of investigating human rights violations, such as na- 
tional commissions on human rights. 
So there are a number of very, very specific steps we think 
British Petroleum, Royal Dutch Shell, other large multinational 
oil companies, can implement to minimize the danger of their 
becoming complicit in government human rights violations. 
Let me conclude by just saying that the fact that we lack 
standards that the international human rights movement 
needs, and that are necessary to ensure respect for universally 
recognized human rights, underscores an important challenge 
for us. The question it raises is, "If there is a gap, why not fill 
it?" - which raises the following question, "how to best fill the 
gap?" 
I want to put a possible solution on the table. It is an idea 
that we have talked about at Human Rights Watch, and others 
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have undoubtedly discussed as well. Why not an international 
standard governing corporate conduct for involvement in 
human rights violations? 
If you talk with officials from any of a number of U.S.-based 
corporations about the importance of their avoiding complicity 
in governmental rights abuses and their adopting a proactive 
approach, they quickly tell you, "How can you expect us as an 
American company to  do this, because if we stick our head up 
above the parapet on human rights issues, we will be disadvan- 
taged vis-a-vis our German or Canadian or French of Japanese 
competitors? You think those companies give a damn about 
human rights? We will lose out." 
I think there is a grain of real truth to that, underscoring 
the fact that these practices will not best be regulated either 
through voluntary codes or national legislation on the domestic 
level. We are dealing, obviously, with a globalized situation, 
and the way to  respond to that is through an international 
standard. 
Now, there was an unsuccessful experience two decades ago 
attempting to  draft a code for transnational corporations. That 
ran aground on the shoals of the new international economic 
order. But the world has changed a great deal since then. We 
are no longer in a world that is polarized by ideological and 
sharp political divisions, and certainly the market economy's 
hegemony is under no serious challenge. 
We have seen in the apparel and footwear industries, the 
food industries, more recently among some oil companies, an ef- 
fort at self-regulation. Why not create a standard that state 
governments, both those hosting multinationals and those 
where multinationals are operating, could adopt that would 
govern the human rights conduct of corporations? 
Certainly, we could identify many, many reasons why this 
would be difficult, and undoubtedly it would be. But would it be 
wrong? Wouldn't it actually be right? I leave that thought with 
you in the spirit of this important anniversary. 
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Program Lawyers Committee for Human Rights* 
I will try today to very briefly discuss the World Bank and 
human rights, and some of the factors related to efforts to in- 
crease the Bank's consideration of human rights related to its 
work. The World Bank is of course just one of several interna- 
tional financial institutions whose activities directly affect or  
implicate human rights concerns, e.g., the International Mone- 
tary Fund and regional institutions like the Inter-American De- 
velopment Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. But due 
to time constraints, a focus just on the World Bank makes sense 
- it is the largest and most influential of the multilateral de- 
velopment banks, often setting the pace for other institutions. 
It is useful to note at the outset that while this Panel is to 
focus on "non-state actors," the World Bank and similar institu- 
tions are a bit of a hybrid, as they are created and owned by 
states. Thus, in a technical sense, they are not really non-state 
actors. However, given the fact that the management and staff 
of the Bank have enormous authority on a wide range of issues 
and decision-making that do not require the involvement of the 
Bank's board and its governmental representatives, its inclu- 
sion in this discussion is appropriate. 
What I would like to  try to do in the short time available is 
to discuss four areas: first, to review some of the relevant his- 
tory of human rights at the World Bank; second to mention 
some recent developments; third, to briefly note the types of 
human rights issues that often arise in Bank activities; and 
fourth, to suggest some approaches and strategies to advance 
the consideration of human rights. 
* Ms. Armstrong generously submitted a written transcript of the paper she 
presented at the Celebration. It is that paper, The World Bank and Human Rights: 
Policies and Prospects, which is printed here. Notably, her remarks at the Cele- 
bration did not vary substantially -if  a t  all - from this paper. 
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To understand the World Bank's current view of human 
rights, it is useful to know a bit of its earlier encounters with 
the issue. Until the late 1980s, issues were almost entirely 
brought to the Bank as a result of external pressure. 
First the United Nations, of which the World Bank is a spe- 
cialized agency: In 1965 and 1967 the UN General Assembly 
passed resolutions calling for its specialized agencies to deny 
economic assistance to South Africa and Rhodesia because of 
their apartheid and other policies in Africa. The World Bank's 
response was that its charter prohibited i t  from complying with 
these resolutions. Article 4, Section 10, of the Bank's Articles of 
Agreement - the provision invariably cited in discussions 
about human rights - states: 
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs 
of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by 
the political character of the member or members concerned. 
Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decision, 
and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in order to 
achieve the purposes stated in Article 1.l  
The UN's legal counsel disagreed with the Bank's interpreta- 
tion, arguing, I think correctly, that this provision was intended 
to prohibit interference by the Bank in internal political affairs 
and discrimination against a government because of its political 
character (e.g., socialist, capitalist, etc.).2 However, that view 
did not prevail and the Bank continued to approve loans to 
South Africa and Rhodesia. 
Human rights concerns have also been raised by individual 
members of the Bank. It must be remembered that no one gov- 
ernment can control the Bank: each holds only one weighted 
vote related to its contribution - e.g., the United States, while 
the largest shareholder, has less than 17% of the voting power. 
In 1977, Section 701 of the International Financial Institu- 
tions Act3 was passed as a result of the Bank's controversial aid 
to human-rights-violating Chile. Section 701 requires United 
1 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and De- 
velopment, opened for signature, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440 (1946), TIAS No. 
1502, 2 UNTS 134, as amended Dec. 16, 1965, 16 UST 1942, TIAS No. 5929. 
2 See 21 UN GAOR 4-20, UN Doc. AlC.4 SR 1653 (prov. ed. 1966), reprinted 
in 6 International Legal Materials 171, 172 (1967). 
3 22 U.S.C. 262d. 
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States representatives at the World Bank and other MDBs to 
oppose loans to governments engaging in "gross violations of in- 
ternationally recognized human rights" except if loans "directly 
benefit the needy." While the effectiveness of this law can be 
debated, it did raise the visibility of human rights in the World 
Bank and other MDBs, as well as in the U.S. Treasury Depart- 
ment. Since then, other US laws addressing human rights is- 
sues have been passed, including ones calling for fair labor 
practices, respect for the rights of indigenous peoples and the 
promotion of good governance, participation and reduced mili- 
tary expenditures. 
In the 1980s, World Bank staff members started to give 
human rights more attention, although typically not using 
human rights terminology. They instead relied on terms like 
"governance" and "participation," a practice that largely contin- 
ues today. For the most part, their consideration of human 
rights was not for the value of these rights as rights, but rather 
for what they contribute to economic performance, or, more pre- 
cisely, development effectiveness. This broadening reflected 
their conclusion that economic performance was not just af- 
fected by a policy but also the policy environment in which it 
was implemented, and this could involve human rights. 
In 1989, the Bank published a report in which the Bank 
explicitly referred to human rights.4 For example, the report 
referred to the importance of the rule of law which "implies re- 
habilitation of the judicial system, independence for the judici- 
ary [and] scrupulous respect for the law and human rights at 
every level of government . . . ."5 The rubric used for these is- 
sues was governance. 
The growing attention to human rights prompted the 
Bank's General Counsel, Ibrahim Shihata, to  issue a legal opin- 
ion in late 1990 in which he sought to  "establish a legally sound 
framework for treating the issue of governance in the Bank's 
work."6 Denominating human rights as "political" within the 
4 World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa - From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, A 
Long-Term Perspective Study (1989). 
5 Id. at 192. 
6 Memorandum of the Vice President and General Counsel, "Issues of 'Gov- 
ernance in Borrowing Members - The Extent of Their Relevance Under the 
Bank's Articles of Agreementn, at 2 (Dec. 21, 1990). 
Heinonline - -  11 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 241 1999 
242 PACE INT'L L. REV. Wol. 11:239 
context of the charter, Mr. Shihata reiterated the charter's re- 
strictions, but then stated that a violation of political rights 
might reach such proportions as to  become a Bank concern due 
to  their economic effects but only if such effects were "signifi- 
cant," "direct" or "preponderant."7 This opinion opened an im- 
portant door. 
So what do governance and participation mean in human 
rights terms a t  the World Bank? Neither concept has yet been 
reduced to an operational requirement, so there is no formal 
definition. Governance is quite a flexible term, but its human 
rights dimensions have generally related to transparency, ac- 
countability and a predictable legal framework. This usually 
means the need for an independent judiciary, a free press, an 
active and involved civil society, and non-discrimination laws 
(regarding the latter, the Bank has said: "Inherent in the con- 
cept of the rule of law is the notion of fairness and social 
justice9'8). 
I must also note that one of the strong motivations for the 
Bank's consideration of governance issues from the beginning to 
the present has been its concern about corruption. Human 
rights and corruption are not synonymous but are linked in 
many ways. Perhaps more importantly, no fight against corrup- 
tion will be successful without respect for human rights. 
Participation, a related concept, was developed simultane- 
ously and closely related to the Bank's thinking about govern- 
ance. Very generally, participation means the involvement of 
those affected by Bank activities - stakeholders - in their 
planning and implementation. Again, development effective- 
ness is the ultimate objective. The benefits provided to the 
Bank by participation include: 
1. knowledge of how the intended beneficiaries of Bank activities 
see their needs and priorities 
2. increase grassroots watchdogs who can monitor and press for 
government accountability, and 
3. through operational collaboration with NGOs, better imple- 
mentation of Bank projects than if the Bank was working 
solely with governments. 
7 Id. at 38, 55. 
8 World Bank, Governance: The World Bank's Experience, at 23 (1994). 
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Participation, like governance, has important human rights 
dimensions, most notably the importance of freedom of associa- 
tion, assembly and expression. 
But what about economic, social and cultural rights? In 
contrast to civil and political rights, the Bank has taken a less 
restrictive approach to economic and social rights. Indeed, it 
has stated that they are its raison d'etre. The problem for a 
human rights activist is how the Bank addresses these rights in 
its work. In essence, the Bank has stated that its respect for or 
observance of these rights is inevitable, even automatic, as it is 
subsumed within the Bank's poverty alleviation efforts - for 
example, in strategies to promote job creation or provide basic 
social  service^.^ While there is no question that many Bank 
projects address important economic and social issues, the plan- 
ning, design and implementation of these projects or its policies 
more generally are not undertaken with a rights-based- 
approach. 
While the Bank's parameters for its consideration of 
human rights which I've just described are still largely in place, 
there have been a number of developments which present - or 
seem to present - opportunities for greater attention to human 
rights by the Bank. I will try to quickly note changes in five 
areas. 
"Good governance" has continued to get attention and very 
soon will likely be an important criteria for the allocation of aid. 
This will occur through a soon-to-be completed agreement gen- 
erally known as the IDA-12 Replenishment Agreement. Re- 
plenishment agreements are negotiated every three years by 
donors to the arm of the Bank that lends to  the poorest coun- 
tries, the International Development Association (IDA). The 
agreement sets terms and conditions on the use of the donors' 
contributions and in recent years has been an important tool to 
advance Bank reform. For example, the IDA-10 agreement in 
1992 called for the liberalization of the Bank's information pol- 
icy and the creation of a new complaint mechanism, now the 
World Bank Inspection Panel, both of which were hard-fought 
NGO objectives. The recently negotiated IDA-12 agreement, 
9 See, e.g., "The World Bank and the Promotion of Human Rights," UN DOC. 
A/CONF.157PC/Gl/Add.19 (June 10, 1993) [the Bank's submission to the World 
Conference on Human Rights in V i e ~ a  in June 19931. 
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which still has a few steps to go before finalization, reportedly 
will require that the governance of a recipient government be 
taken into account in determining the allocation of the Bank's 
aid dollars. Details about this new requirement are not yet 
available, so it is not clear how "governance" will be defined or 
how it will be applied. It is therefore difficult to assess what 
this change will mean, but it appears to be significant. Given 
that the term governance is subject to a variety of interpreta- 
tions, it will be essential for this new criteria to be monitored 
closely to ensure that it is applied fairly - no matter what the 
size and influence of a country - and consistent with relevant 
international standards, including human rights norms. 
In the area of participation, the Bank continues to empha- 
size its importance. Among the developments - not all of 
which are positive - are: 
1. The Bank has increased the number of staff focusing on NGO 
issues a t  headquarters, in both central and regional divisions, 
and created new staff positions in a majority of its resident 
missions in borrowing countries. 
2. There has been a welcome acknowledgment by the Bank of 
the importance of an enabling environment for NGOs if they 
are to be able to contribute to Bank activities. However, the 
translation of this acknowledgment into practice has fallen 
short and raised serious human rights concerns. In 1997, the 
Bank issued a discussion draft of a document called the 
"Handbook on Good Practices for Laws Related to NGOs." In 
the Lawyers Committee's view, this document is inconsistent 
in several respects with international freedom of association 
principles and, as a result, presents risks to NGOs, particu- 
larly advocacy groups.1° While the Bank has agreed to revise 
the draft Handbook and the problems will hopefully be cor- 
rected, its approach in this instance reflects a serious lack of 
due regard to human rights principles directly relevant to its 
work. 
10 See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, "The World Bank, NGOs and 
Freedom of Association: A Critique of the World Bank's draft 'Handbook on Good 
Practices for Laws Related to Non-Governmental Organizations'" (November 
1997). 
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3. Likewise, a recent Bank paper discussed by its Boardl1 while 
reaffirming the importance of NGOs to its work, also notes as 
an "emerging issue" the need for the Bank to give "due regard 
to the prerogative of governments" in the selection of NGOs 
for involvement in Bank activities. This illustrates a desire 
on the part of some governments to limit the groups that 
Bank staff can contact to only those it approves, which often 
may not include human rights groups. 
Another notable development was the Bank's publication in 
October of a short report entitled Development and Human 
Rights: The World Bank's Role. It commemorates the 50th an- 
niversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and it 
includes a foreword by Mary Robinson, the UN High Commis- 
sioner for Human Rights.. What is important about the report is 
not so much what it says - its aim is not surprisingly to put the 
World Bank in the best possible light in relation to human 
rights and therefore does not mention a whole range of human 
rights problems, particularly ones related to the implementa- 
tion of projects. What is important in my view is that the report 
was issued at  all, something that would not have happened very 
long ago, and that, by this report, there is an explicit recogni- 
tion by the Bank of the relevance of the Universal Declaration 
to its activities. It should also be noted that the report's discus- 
sion of the limits presented by its charter to the consideration of 
human rights is more nuanced than in the. past, something that 
is especially welcome. 
Other developments include the Bank's reporting and some 
policy development on several rights or rights-related issues, 
e.g., gender, child labor, post-conflict reconstruction, and the 
creation in some cases of institutional structures and joint ef- 
forts which involve external players to focus on these issues. 
Recent examples of the latter include the Structural Adjust- 
ment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) and the External 
Gender Consultative Group. 
A fundamental point must also be made: leadership is im- 
portant in increasing the World Bank's attention to human 
rights and James Wolfensohn, since he became the Bank's pres- 
11 The NGO Unit, Social Development, "The Bank's Relations with NGOs: Is- 
sues and Directors, Social Developent Paper No. 28 (World Bank, August 11, 
1998). 
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ident in 1995, has taken a number of important, if not yet fully 
realized, steps in this direction. That said, any effort to seek re- 
form in the Bank cannot ignore or underestimate the size, com- 
plexity, culture and tradition of this 53-year-old institution. 
Having described how the World Bank views human rights, 
I would now like to mention some of the types of human rights 
issues that are often raised. 
On a policy level, one example has already been mentioned 
- the flawed draft Handbook on Good Practices for Laws Relat- 
ing to NGOs. Other issues include operational policies gov- 
erning indigenous peoples and involuntary resettlement, both of 
which directly implicate human rights. 
But it is often the case that the policy is not the problem, 
but rather its implementation. Moreover, the human rights is- 
sues presented by Bank-supported projects are often more di- 
rectly related to  the overall human rights environment that 
exists in the country. While the Bank rarely is the instigator of 
violations, it is not a minor player as it has great influence in 
the selection and design of projects and has supervisory obliga- 
tions during implementation. Some projects with human rights 
problems that have received recent attention include: 
1. Structural adjustment programs which reduce resources 
available for social services like heath care, education, hous- 
ing and the like. 
The Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project in Argentina and Para- 
guay is supported by both the World Bank and Inter-Ameri- 
can Development Bank and implemented by a binational 
organization. Human rights problems have included serious 
health concerns related to the manner in which the dam has 
been built and filled; intimidation of critics; and loss of liveli- 
hood without compensation. The project was developed with- 
out consultation or information to those affected by the 
project. 
3. The Lagos Drainage and Sanitation Project in Nigeria has 
been the subject of NGO reports that the residents of 15 Lagos 
slums were forcibly evicted by the government, in an opera- 
tion that included the demolition of homes and other property 
without compensation, resettlement or rehabilitation. Resi- 
dents were also threatened and intimidated by armed secur- 
ity agents. 
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4. In connection with the NTPC Power Generation Project in 
Singrali, India, government andlor power company authori- 
ties engaged in a pattern of human rights violations against 
persons displaced by the project who sought to peacefully pro- 
test. Violations included arbitrary detention, degrading treat- 
ment in custody, indiscrimnate use of force, as well as limits 
on freedom of assembly and association. 
5. A Chadian legislator who was critical on corruption grounds 
of the proposed Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and 
Pipeline Project was charged, convicted and jailed for insult- 
ing and defaming the Chadian president. Two journalists 
were similarly charged and have stopped reporting on the 
project. Local NGO representatives at a recent meeting were 
quoted as saying: 'We are limited by survival concerns when 
we conflict with decision-makers" and "Government repres- 
sion is our reality." 
When the World Bank works in places where repression is the 
normal response to criticism, it must approach those projects 
with extreme care. 
We know about these projects because NGO efforts have 
brought them wider attention. But repression of NGOs can also 
make them reluctant to take up monitoring at all. In some coun- 
tries, independent NGOs are so severely restricted that  few if 
any exist. In  such situations, the Bank is left to consult with 
international NGOs, who may be very good but are less desira- 
ble then local groups, or it consults with GONGOs - govern- 
ment-organized NGOs which cannot be described as 
independent - or it doesn't consult with anyone outside gov- 
ernment. None of these solutions are apt to provide the Bank 
with a n  honest local perspective or the views it needs to do a n  
effective job. 
I hope that  two things are clear from the above. First, 
there are real opportunities to increase the Bank's attention to 
human rights. But second, there is little likelihood of such con- 
crete or systematic attention by the Bank without the active in- 
volvement of NGOs. 
In addition to the new opportunities noted earlier, the Asia 
crisis has  meant that  the Bank can no longer use economic 
growth as an excuse for ignoring the behavior of repressive and 
authoritarian governments. While new Bank policies provide 
sometimes explicit, or at least implicit, recognition of human 
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rights, it is essential that they be monitored if there is to  be any 
assurance of implementation. An NGO role at the World Bank 
is critical for the advancement of human rights. The Bank has 
not reached the point where it treats human rights law - na- 
tional or international - in the same way that it looks at com- 
mercial law, e.g., trade, intellectual property, and the like, even 
when both have equal stature. 
There are several ways which I believe will advance human 
rights and the ability to undertake human rights advocacy at 
the Bank. I'll mention five here: 
1. Create a pre-approval project assessment process to consider: 
1) the effects of proposed projects on human rights in a coun- 
try and 2) the effects of human rights observance in a country 
on the purpose and likely success of the proposed project, and 
take this information into account during the appraisal of the 
project. 
2. Use Bank oversight and evaluation mechanisms, such as pub- 
lic expenditure reviews, to assess the condition of economic 
and social rights in a country, and make its findings public. 
3. Further liberalize the Bank's information policy and increase 
the translation of documents into local languages. 
4. Adopt requirements for the mandatory release to and consul- 
tation with non-governmental actors of the Country Assist- 
ance Strategy during its preparation. The CAS is an 
important document outlining the future needs and priorities 
to be addressed by the Bank. 
5. Strengthen the Inspection Panel, for example, to provide 
those who file complaints with an opportunity to review and 
react to Bank management's response; to allow the Panel 
members to visit the site and interview complainants. 
A final point. The World Bank is not the UN Commission 
on Human Rights, but it undertakes a wide variety of activities 
which directly affect human rights. Greater attention by the 
Bank to human rights is not without challenges and sensitivi- 
ties, but there has been movement and there are new opportu- 
nities. The Bank's recent human rights report commemorates 
the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and the relevance of that event to its mandate. NGOs 
must redouble efforts to  see that this recognition is not simply a 
public relations effort. 
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QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS 
Q: Would the panelists address the issue of corruption, 
which has affected so many of the poor countries? 
PROF. McDONNELL: Patricia, do you want to start off? 
PROF. ARMSTRONG: 
Corruption is, as I mentioned, getting lots of consideration 
at  the Bank, realizing, again, that development effectiveness is 
a key. So there is a recognition that they are not getting the 
bang for their buck because of corruption. 
Again, it is not the same as human rights. But, as a friend 
of mine says, "human rights is the caboose on the anti-corrup- 
tion train." Therefore, it is a real opportunity on a whole range 
of human rights issues to raise our concerns and get the Bank's 
attention, because it is focusing for a variety of reasons. They 
are having many P.R. problems. Particularly, Indonesia is a 
good example most recently. 
PROF. NAGAN: 
There is no question that the whole notion of the clientless 
state, which some of the early scholarship focused on and was 
largely ignored, is very critical, I think, just from a state angle. 
But the states are not the only players in the corruption game. 
We have formal definitions of the state territory, people, things 
like that. What we have not done is functionally label them - 
and some of them are, obviously, thought control, drug control, 
and so forth. So we tend to use the abstraction "sovereignty" 
without regard for the real dynamism inside the state and how 
it is actually organized. 
In fact, the notion of combatting corruption may be the 
most radical invention that we can bring to development and to 
human rights work. The simple notion of accounting for people 
who believe the state is a milk cow, or corporations that have 
cozy relations with a state, or the problems basically even of 
development. 
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For example, in South Africa, they have had radical dispos- 
session of the blacks over 300 years, and now the question is, 
how do they get economic empowerment? Of course, for many 
people, there is a search for shortcuts to it, and so corruption 
has become virtually a kind of freedom-destroying kind of virus 
on the effort to create a culture, as opposed to the apartheid 
culture, of human rights and development. 
So I think the corruption issue is one of the most important 
issues. Simple as it may sound, the notion of accountants who 
may not have their throats cut is quite a vital thing as well in 
making this go. 
But we also have to put this into the context of NGOs and 
the many different kinds of NGOs. Alan Bussack right now is 
on trial for allegedly leading the good life with Danish money in 
South Africa. And so, the corruption factor is not just statal, 
but it can permeate all the other institutions that otherwise 
started out with good intentions. 
So yes, it is a critical factor, and maybe even an under-ap- 
preciated factor. 
MR. DICKER: 
Could I just add very quickly, in responding to your ques- 
tion, that certainly we have seen such close links between cor- 
ruption and human rights violations. Where corruption exists 
pervasively, it is often facilitated by a government's violations 
of its citizens' right to free expression or free association. And 
certainly in those instances - we are seeing this in parts of 
west Africa now, where corruption about the construction of an 
oil pipeline from Chad to Cameroon is taking place,l and those 
who have been speaking out about the corruption have been im- 
prisoned for exercising their right to free expression. 
So there is a very, very close nexus in many situations, and 
I think we've got some work to do to figure out, from a human 
rights reporting perspective, how to do a better job of including 
that into at least the context of our report. 
1 See Tansamu, Chad-Cameroon: Oil Pipeline Project Brought To a Stand- 
still, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 1, 1998, 1998 WL 5989059, AFRICA NEWS SER- 
VICE, Aug. 4, 1998, 1998 WL 14362793. 
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PROF. McDONNELL: Another question? 
Q: Accountants have come out with standards for whistle 
blowing as part of their job when they find a client has not re- 
ported properly. I have not noticed too many attorneys, includ- 
ing those involved in tobacco or working for major financial 
corporations, following that same standard. In fact, although 
they are listed, they are very rarely enforced. How would you 
deal with that? 
I have seen it in this country, for example, where corporate 
officers' lawyers effectively allow human rights violations, or vi- 
olations of certainly many of this country's laws. How can they 
then apply that in other countries? 
PROF. NAGAN: 
There is one. I am involved with something now with AID.2 
Essentially, we have had to transfer vast amounts of money to 
Uganda. It is always a nightmare to make sure that every cent 
is accounted for and there is a paper trail that follows all of this. 
What AID wants to do is to insist that it  be done through the 
U.S. to them. I tried to tell them, 'Why don't you do it over 
there?" We held the grant up because of this particular prob- 
lem, because it is very difficult. I have had to make many trips 
over there to do the paper trail. In fact, the vast amount of the 
human rights work I have done has been basically accounting. 
You get the grant and then you have to do all these fancy 
things. 
Even with Amnesty International, when I became Chair, 
with perhaps the naivete of an outsider coming in there, but I 
really wanted to ask some very naive questions that did not nec- 
essarily show up on the way in which the accountants had for- 
mulated things. It did help to rationalize our own way of doing 
things, because we wanted to know where this went, what hap- 
pened afterwards, and why are we putting more money into it if 
we got nothing out of it. 
Uganda again is an interesting case because there is a fe- 
tish for paper now. You know, one of the reactions has been 
that everything has got to be on paper with an  accounting and 
2 Agency For International Development. 
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so on, which has actually in some ways made our task a little 
easier. 
But there is no question that the resource issue which I 
raised is one of the problems of NGOs, but also of governments, 
and the paper trail for money and the transparency is the cure 
for a great deal of what actually happens. Greed and venality 
and so on are not outside of the framework of human feeling 
and motivation and so forth. 
QUESTIONER: 
I think one of the difficulties is that, although we have laws 
about bribery, in joint ventures with foreign corporations those 
laws are very, very hard to enforce. I t  is very hard to enforce 
rules of corruption where the partner, the foreign corporation, is 
doing the bribery. 
PROF. NAGAN: 
You are talking about the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act3? 
QUESTIONER: Yes. 
PROF. NAGAN: That makes most American businessmen 
crooks. 
QUESTIONER: Exactly. 
PROF. McDONNELL: Richard, did you want to respond? 
MR. DICKER: 
Just  on that aspect of it, again what we have heard from 
many of our interlocutors in the corporate sector has been the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act creates a real disadvantage for 
American corporations - "Of course we support it, we honor it, 
but in Germany there is no such statutory prohibition and our 
German counterparts hand envelopes full of money over to cor- 
porate officials, government officials, and how can we compete 
with 'that?" 
Again, I think what that does underscore is the need for 
moving this debate out of just the national arena and trying to 
put it on the level of international standard setting. 
3 15 U.S.C. $ 78 (1988). 
Heinonline - -  11 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 252 1999 
19991 HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-STATE ACTORS 253 
Q: As the ethical investment bandwagon has been picking 
up a lot of steam, at least in Britain and Europe, and I imagine 
in the States as well, that has had a lot of effect on corporate 
practice. At the same time, consumer action in fields like carpet 
manufacture - the symbol which shows that they are not made 
by children - and so on. And then, we saw the instance of the 
oil rig that Shell wanted to ditch in the Atlantic and consumer 
action in Germany had a big effect on that. 
It seems to me that the field is pretty wide open, if only we 
NGOs can get together and work out a satisfactory code of con- 
duct and then insist on its being followed, a frame in which, 
either by consumer action or by shareholder action, penalties 
will be imposed. I wonder what you think the prospects are for 
NGOs getting together worldwide to work out such a code. 
MR. DICKER: 
Let me make two points. First, with the broad trend that 
you have cited, in terms of things being pretty well wide open, 
actually I really agree with that. I think back just a couple of 
years ago, to 1994, when President Clinton made the decision to  
de-link most-favored nation trade status for China and Chinese 
human rights practices,4 and how at least the American corpo- 
rate community was on a roll - I mean, it really was a jugger- 
naut the way corporate America organized itself to bring about 
the end of that kind of connection between human rights and 
investment policy of the United States Government. 
In a sense, I think the terrain has changed a good deal 
since then. I mean, that was a moment in my perception that 
the corporate community was really, really flexing its muscle 
extremely powerfully. 
I think the kinds of developments you alluded to, in terms 
of consumer actions that have occurred over the last few years 
as a result of a range of NGO actors, from the National Labor 
Committee, to the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibil- 
ity - I mean, there are many, many NGO actors in this field. 
And I think the terrain has changed, whereby the corporate sec- 
4 Presidential Press Conference on China Most Favored Nation Status, May 
26, 1994, (visited March 12, 1999) <http://www.pub.Whitehouse.gov/retrieve- 
documents.html>. 
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tor is more unnoticed and a bit more on the defensive. I think 
that is a very positive development. 
I think that we are not simply talking about the apparel 
and footwear companies traditionally - Levi, Reebok, Liz Clai- 
borne, those companies that have been out in front in a good 
way on a voluntary basis trying to change their practices - but 
we have seen it in the oil industry among a few companies. So I 
think conditions, in a way, are positive. 
I also think that you are absolutely right, that what this 
would require is a worldwide international effort on the part of 
the NGO community reflecting its disparate segments - 
human rights, environmental, et cetera. I think we need to be 
dreamers and visionaries. I think that is possible. I think the 
conditions are there to make it happen. 
PROF. NAGAN: 
I think there are several levels of response, and I will t ry to 
be brief. 
One is simply whether one approaches the relationship 
with corporations from an adverse point of view. I was very in- 
volved in the anti-apartheid aspect of it in the university divest- 
ment in the early 1970s and then later. That has certainly paid 
dividends. 
But basically, it is very tough to take on these major play- 
ers. So there are limits, but certainly you can do that. I suspect 
that most human rights NGOs tend to posture themselves in 
adverse relationships. 
Now, the Secretary General has taken a different view most 
recently. Maybe i t  is the Ted Turner initiative. Not all corpora- 
tions are necessarily going to be adverse. There is a difference 
between Turner and Murdoch. 
So his position - and I think it is a correct one in my view, 
with all due respect to my colleagues - was to say, "Look, we've 
got to reach out to these guys and show them that it is in their 
interest that peace, that human rights, that development and 
other related, coordinated strategies are on their agenda as well 
and that they have some responsibility for it." 
Now, that is a different strategy. That is a more coopera- 
tive strategy. To some people, that is a selling-out. I under- 
stand the dynamic here. 
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But the problem of globalism that is positive for the vast 
majority of the have-nots of the planet, if you look at  - I think 
somebody mentioned Africa yesterday; half the people of sub- 
Saharan Africa are living on a buck a day. So there is this abso- 
lute brutal, grinding, poverty dynamic here. 
I think that, unfortunately, or rightly or wrongly, the ex- 
isting reality is that if a Third World country does not come into 
the system more or less the way it is, you do not have to do 
anything to them; you can just leave them to completely wither 
on the vine. So that the old socialists from South Africa have 
become global capitalists, and even the residue of the Commu- 
nist Party in South Africa says, 'We are investing in these cor- 
porations. What are we going to do with our dough? We are 
going to have seven hours on Marxism." 
So I think this is not simple, but I think the brute reality is 
that these are major centers of global power, and I do not think 
you can always confront them in this kind of adversarial mode, 
and you cannot assume that they themselves are not complex 
organizations, and you have to find out the extent to which you 
can shift them into a different paradigm and redefine their own 
self-interest. 
QUESTIONER: 
I do agree with that, particularly now that NGOs them- 
selves are having to have very often sponsorship of some of 
these countries. 
PROF. NAGAN: I am afraid Amnesty ran with Reebok. 
Q: I have a question following up on what you just said. 
We have done this with tobacco and with other financial institu- 
tions. Corporations have seen that it is in their interest and to 
their bottom line in many different ways and will be more coop- 
erative to make changes. That is one thing. 
The other is there are corporations that are doing this. 
Why not get those corporations together and see what they have 
done and see how then they can influence other corporations to 
also become good partners and good players for working in this 
field? Let's work with them and take what is good and then see 
where we can grow and develop from there. 
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MR. DICKER: 
I think that is very important, and I think - Trish, maybe 
you know more about this than I do - but I think the apparel 
industry partnership effort, which - I cannot recall - six or 
seven of the most human rights-conscious footwear and apparel 
companies are exactly trying to do that, reach out to other com- 
- panies in that sector and bring them into the kind of agreement 
that they have made as part of the AIP.5 I think that is very 
important. 
We have talked to certain oil companies about playing that 
same kind of role. The world oil industry sector is not uniform. 
You can see more advanced companies, and exactly the question 
is: what can they do to turn their competitors and bring them 
along? That is at an  early stage. 
I think, to be frank about it, their response is a kind of a 
polite, but very cynical, reaction, "The guys down the block a t  
Exxon are not going to pay any attention to this whatsoever." I 
do not think we should just accept that. I think we've got to be 
tenacious on that, but I think that is a very important strategy. 
Lastly, as an overarching thing, I certainly do not mean to 
suggest that i t  is a question simply of confrontation. I think it 
is a question of working with the best. I think we have to be 
clear ourselves. We have different objectives, different inter- 
ests. We have to try to be able, between the best elements in 
the corporate community and the NGO community, to identify 
where our interests overlap and how we can work together, and 
be honest and candid with one another that we will not always 
agree and that  is just the nature of the world. 
PROF. McDONNELL: Patricia, did you want to respond? 
MS. ARMSTRONG: No. 
PROF. McDONNELL: Other questions? 
Q: I just have a comment to make. I was talking to some- 
one who mentioned an exciting development in terms of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In December 1997, the 0ECD6 
5 Apparel Industry Partnership Effort. 
6 Organisation For Economic Cooperation and Development. 
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completed a treaty, a Bribery Convention,' which does require 
OECD nations to adopt and enforce it. It not only requires 
OECD nations to make bribery an offense within their jurisdic- 
tions, which they probably already had, but it also requires 
them to make bribery overseas anywhere by their nationals an 
offense, which could be a precursor to these international stan- 
dards that we have been talking about. It is in, I think, a very 
controversial area, to make a judgment about bribery overseas. 
I think just seeing how that works will be very interesting. 
Q: Just a brief comment. I think that the argument put 
forward by some corporations, the argument based on if they do 
not do it others will, is a very insensitive, immoral, and many 
think it is an unlawful argument that should not be given any 
weight at all and we should waste no time refuting this argu- 
ment. This is one comment. 
My other point is that it is very hard for some NGOs to be 
objective and to  stay with a humanitarian, even-handed ap- 
proach to  problems. I had a discussion yesterday with an Am- 
nesty International activist who was asking me about the 
Lebanese detainees in south Lebanon in the so-called Israeli se- 
curity zone, without showing any interest at all in the condi- 
tions and plight of thousands of Lebanese detainees in Syria. 
MS. ARMSTRONG: 
Could I just make one point? There is a similarity here to 
your first point, about when the corporation says "if we do not 
do it, someone else will." The World Bank says something quite 
similar: "Our involvement means our higher standards will be 
applied, and therefore it is better for us to be involved. You do 
not want us to leave. You should not press us to leave this 
otherwise-questionable project because of that reason." 
PROF. McDONNELL: 
Thank you, and I would like to thank the panelists for their 
discussion. 
7 United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in Interna- 
tional Commercial Transactions, G.A. Res. 191, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. 
N601 (1997). 
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An aging pot of flowers adorned with a cross hangs from the 
picket fence where gay University of Wyoming student Mat- 
thew Shepard was tied, beaten, and left just outside of Laramie. 
Shepard was beaten October 6, 1998 and moved to a Fort Col- 
lins hospital after he was found with severe head injuries. 
Shepard died on October 12, 1998. 
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